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Abstract 
Many large listed firms offer workers the opportunity to buy shares in the firm at discounted rates 
through employee stock purchase plans (ESPP).  The discounted rate creates a gift exchange, where 
the firm hopes that workers who accept the gift reciprocate with greater loyalty and effort.  But ESPPs 
diverge from standard gift exchange or efficiency wage models. Employees have to invest some of 
their own money by purchasing shares at the discounted rate to accept the gift.  A sizeable number 
choose to reject the gift.  In addition, the value of the ESPP gift varies with the share price and thus 
with the performance of the firm and the effort of workers in total.  For workers who buy subsidized 
shares, an ESPP sets up a group incentive pay system analogous to profit sharing, all-employee stock 
options, or an employment ownership scheme that makes part of workers' compensation depend on 
company performance.  
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Introduction 
Many large listed firms have employee stock purchase plans (ESPP) that offer workers the 
opportunity to buy shares of stock at discounted rates. The discount is generally high enough 
that workers who participate in an ESPP can make a profit even if the share price does not 
change or falls moderately.  In this sense, an ESPP resembles a gift exchange in which the 
firm offers workers a gift in the hope that this induces productivity-enhancing or cost-
reducing behaviour that increases profits and pays for the gift.  But ESPPs are not standard 
gift exchanges. Workers have the choice of accepting or rejecting the gift. They must put 
down some of their own money to buy the discounted shares and must hold the shares for a 
specified period before they can cash in on the gift.  During that time the share price/value of 
the gift can vary.   
For the workers who join an ESPP, the plan resembles a group incentive contract like profit-
sharing, gain-sharing, all-employee stock option plans, or some other employee ownership 
scheme.  Workers as a group have an incentive to be more productive and raise the share 
price but they and the firm have to overcome the free rider problem in order to make the 
group incentive work.  But an ESPP differs from a standard group incentive system.  It covers 
only workers who join the plan rather than all workers.  By giving workers the choice of 
accepting or rejecting the gift/incentive contract, an ESPP creates a dual labor market within 
the firm between workers with an ownership stake that makes their incomes depend on how 
the stock market values the firm and workers paid fixed wages.  
Most ESPP plans offer sufficiently large discounts on share prices that should make them 
financially appealing to most employees.  Even so, studies of ESPPs find that many workers 
turn down the gift of the subsidized shares (Engelhardt and Madrian, 2004; Pendleton et al. 
2009; Babenko and Sen, 2010).  In our analyses of the data used in this paper (Bryson and 
Freeman, 2010) we found that approximately half of workers in ShareCo (a pseudonym), a 
multinational business services firm that places its ESPP at the heart of its employee 
compensation system, did not join the share plan and that many others delayed joining when 
it was in their financial interest to join immediately. Some workers had economically rational 
reasons for not joining.  They were planning to leave the firm shortly or were sufficiently 
cash-strapped to make it difficult to finance the purchase of shares.  But others seemed to 
reject the gift for reasons more aligned with behavioural economics findings about hyperbolic 
discount rates, procrastination, and the influence of peers rather than economic calculation.  
In this paper we compare the work behaviour of employees who joined the ShareCo ESPP 
with that of observationally equivalent workers who did not join the plan.  Our analysis is 
based on a survey we conducted of the firm's UK and Ireland employees in 2010.  Section 
One describes ShareCo's share plan, the survey we administered to workers, and the 
statistical model we use to measure differences in behaviour.  Section Two gives our 
estimates of the differences in behaviour between observationally equivalent workers who 
accept and reject the gift/incentive and our assessment of whether the differences reflect 
responses to the ESPP or the selectivity of who joins.  Section Three concludes with a 
theoretical interpretation of the results from the alternative perspectives of pure gift 
exchange, group incentive systems, and employee stock purchase plans. 
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1.The ShareCo Plan, Data, and Estimating Model  
 
ShareCo is a multinational business services corporation whose employee share purchase 
plan is a major part of its compensation package.  Most of the firm's employees are white 
collar workers, who receive considerable information from the firm about the plan.  The plan 
is a Shareholder Incentive Plan (SIP) that qualifies for tax exemptions under United Kingdom 
government rules so that workers benefit from tax breaks as well as the firm's subsidizing the 
price of shares.1 All employees paying tax in the UK can join the plan without regard to age, 
tenure or hours worked.  SIP rules provide tax advantages for employees who contribute a 
minimum of £10 each month up to a maximum amount of £125 or 10 per cent of their 
monthly pre-tax earnings, whichever is the lower amount, to purchase shares.  The money 
spent on shares is exempt from income tax and national insurance contributions as long as the 
employee retains the shares for at least five years.  The employee who sells the shares in the 
first two years after purchase pays income tax and national insurance on the full value of the 
shares at the time they are sold.  Shares sold in years 3 or 4 are taxed on the value of the 
shares when the employee bought them or at the current market value, whichever is lower. 
Thus there is a substantial tax break for holding the shares for five or more years and a 
smaller tax advantage to retaining them for three years before selling them.  
 
ShareCo matches each share an employee purchases up to a value of £125 per month on a 
one-for-one basis. By matching share purchases one for one, ShareCo effectively gives one 
free share for every share the worker buys or alternatively gives a gift of half the price of 
every share the worker buys (up to the specified limit).  The matching shares are taxed in a 
similar way as shares bought under the SIP rules. Employees can invest their dividends in 
dividend shares. Barring a catastrophic fall in share prices, most employees should find the 
ESPP financially attractive. A worker holding shares for three years would double their 
money if the share price held steady due to the gift of matching shares.  The worker would 
break even if the price fell to one half its purchase price.2 
 
In November-December 2010 we surveyed employees in the UK and Irish business 
operations of ShareCo.3 With the assistance of company management we designed a web-
based questionnaire and invited the company's 1,740 employees in the UK and Ireland to visit 
a password-protected survey website and fill out the questionnaire.  Because we had company 
support for the survey, we obtained a high response rate.  Seventy-two percent of employees 
(1,251) visited the survey website, 96% of cent of whom answered the survey (1,205), giving 
a 69% response rate relative to the total workforce.   
 
1  Firms following these tax guidelines have discretion as to the precise nature and generosity of the plan, 
including offering free shares.  ShareCo's matching scheme is typical of SIP plans in the UK.  We thank to Michael 
Landon for discussion of this point. 
2  These are not "phantom shares" because they do confer voting rights.  ShareCo's shareholding employees 
have the right to vote at shareholder meetings, though the total amount of stock held by employees is too small to 
be a major factor in meetings. 
3  As a multinational ShareCo has operations in several other countries.  The pecuniary incentive to join the 
share plan differs across countries  because the firm offers different matching rates to workers and because each 
country gives different tax advantages for ownership. The Australian scheme was more generous, while the South 
African and US schemes were considerably less attractive than the UK SIP (Bryson and Freeman, 2010). 
4 
 
                                                 
The survey contained 72 questions divided into subsets relevant to persons with different 
share plan membership and purchase histories.  Respondents answered the appropriate 
subsets so no one answered the full 72 questions. The survey asked about employee 
demographics (age, gender, household circumstances, education), attitudes toward risk and 
sociability4; the job (wages, occupation, hours worked, whether the worker was paid hourly, 
on a salary basis, or on a salary with a commission); the business unit and office in which the 
employee worked (which allows us to compare behaviour within workplaces); membership in 
the share plan, share holdings, contributions; questions about attitudes towards the job and 
the company, the factors that influenced decisions to join or not join; and what is critical to 
this study, effort and time at work, absences, job search, and prospective quits, and whether 
or not they intervened when they saw other workers not working as they should.   
 
Estimating differences in worker behaviour 
 
As a first step in examining the potential impact of accepting the gift of the subsidized shares 
on worker behaviour we estimate differences in the behaviour of workers who join the ESPP 
and those who do not.  We use multivariate regressions with covariates for demographic and 
job characteristics and for some employee attitudes to isolate differences in work behaviour 
associated with plan membership and differences due to differences in observable personal 
and job-related factors.5 Our baseline equation relates the work behaviour of worker i to plan 
membership, conditional on personal characteristics and the characteristics of their job: 
 
1) 
 iixii XPlanE εββ ++= '1  
 
where iE  measures worker behaviour defined in various ways for individual i, iPlan   
measures the plan status of the individual and 1β  estimates the effect of plan participation on 
worker behaviour. The iX ’s are a vector of individual-level demographic and job 
characteristics (see notes to Table 1 for details) which include the usually unobserved risk 
preferences of workers. They also include log annual earnings and organizational loyalty6 so 
4  The risk scale is based  on the question "Are you generally a person who is fully prepared to take risks or 
do you try to avoid taking risks?" where 1="unwilling to take risks" and 10="fully prepared to take risks". The 
sociability scale counts the number of times employees ticked a box in response to the following question: "Do you 
take part in the following activities, either as part of your job or outside work? Please select as many as apply to 
you...Member of a trade/professional body or association; work in schools, colleges, universities; involved in 
charities or voluntary bodies; member of a social, sports or arts club; active member of a political party; active 
member of a religious group; socialising with co-workers outside of work".   
5  Results are not sensitive to the use of alternative estimation techniques.  
6 The measure of organizational loyalty is an additive scale capturing employees' sense of loyalty and 
attachment to the firm.  Employees are invited to code themselves along a five-point Likert scale running from 
"strongly agree" to "strongly disagree" in response to the statements "I feel very loyal to this organization", " I find 
that my values and the company’s values are very similar" and "Overall this company is a good place to work".  The 
scale is scored from 3 (low attachment) to 15 (high attachment) and a scale reliability coefficient of 0.84. The second 
is an additive scale based on the same Likert-scale coding in response to the statements "I am fairly paid relative to 
my ShareCo colleagues in a similar job" and "I am fairly paid relative to employees with similar jobs in other 
companies".  The scale, which has a reliability coefficient of 0.75, captures the degree to which employees feel they 
are fairly paid.  Correlations between the five items used for the two scales were explored using principal 
components factor analysis with varimax rotation. The items loaded on the two dimensions used to compute these 
two scales with eigen factors of 1.17 and 2.72 respectively. 
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that we compare workers with similar financial and non-financial parts of the compensation 
package independent of the share purchase scheme. If the relationship between worker 
behaviour and plan membership is picking up effects that are due to those other aspects of a 
job, or to an underlying propensity for greater organizational loyalty, then the addition of 
these measures would reduce the estimated coefficient on plan membership. 
 
For each dependent variable we also estimate models where we add dummy variables for the 
work unit of the employee.7 When we include work unit dummies we are estimating 
differences in behaviour between workers who joined the plan and those who did not join 
within the same office/business units.  This controls for unobservable fixed elements of the 
working environment which might induce plan participation and affect behaviour.  If the 
relationship between our dependent variables and plan membership is picking up effects 
common to a workplace, inclusion of these dummies would reduce the estimated β1 
coefficient. 
 
To capture spillovers associated with peers' plan membership we run separate member and 
non-member models incorporating PCMEMBi, a measure of individual i's perception of the 
percentage of employees in the business unit who belong to the Plan.8 
 
Causal impacts versus selectivity 
 
Estimates of equation 1 will pin down the β1 coefficient that measures differences in 
behaviour between observationally equivalent persons who have joined the ShareCo ESPP 
and those that have not.  But estimated differences in work behaviour need not be due solely 
(or at all) to responses to the ESPP.  Accepting the gift/incentive may induce people to 
change their behaviour along the lines of gift-exchange/efficiency wage or of group incentive 
models of behaviour. There is sufficient evidence from econometric and laboratory studies to 
make such an interpretation of differences in behaviour a reasonable one.9  But selectivity of 
persons into the ShareCo stock purchase plan based on characteristics of workers that are 
unobservable to us could also explain differences in work behaviour: a worker who is gungho 
about their job and the firm may accept the gift but not change their behaviour when they join 
the ESPP.  
 
We try to better identify the causal link from accepting the share plan in two ways. First, we 
asked employees on our survey about the causal impact of the share plan on their behaviour. 
Some economists may be dubious that workers' self-reports on their responses to a particular 
company program is credible evidence that the program works.  But there is no incentive for 
workers to “game” the survey, which is anonymous and presumptively incentive compatible. 
In our earlier study workers said that they paid little attention to what the human resource 
7 We use the intersection of ShareCo's 18 business unit and 16 office location to obtain a closer fix on likely 
“work groups” where employees may interact regularly. This yields 46 work units with more than one person. 
8  Responses are coded in seven bands from 'none' through to 100% with the mid-band being 40-59%. 
9     Laboratory experiments identify a clear causal relationship between efficiency wages and effort (Fehr et 
al., 1996) that confirm the "fair wage-effort" hypothesis (Fehr et al., 1993: 437).  But Gneezy and List (2006)'s field 
experiment found the positive impact of the "gift" on effort does not persist over time; and in their field experiment 
Hennig-Schmidt et al. (2010 find no change in work effort associated with changes in one's own wage and suggest in 
a follow-up laboratory experiment that employee reciprocity requires knowledge about the surplus at stake.  By 
contrast, Fehr and Götte (2008) find increased wages increase the overall labour supply in total and the hours of 
work provided, but not the effort per hour. 
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department told them about the plan (Bryson and Freeman, 2010).  If members of the share 
plan said that it did not affect their behaviour, we would find it hard to argue that it did.  If 
they say it has affected them, and the direction of effects is consistent with the observed 
differences in behaviour between workers who join the plan and those who do not, surely the 
combined information should move one's prior in the direction of the program having a real 
effect?  
 
Second, we use an instrumental variables approach to try to tease out the causal impact of 
plan membership.  For this analysis we need a valid instrument.  We use administrative data 
on the proportion of persons at a work-site who were plan members in the past.  This is 
correlated with the plan membership of workers in 2010 and arguably should be independent 
of their workplace behaviour.  
 
2. Estimated Differences in Behaviour 
 
Table 1 presents estimates of β1 for eight related measures of workplace behaviour.  The 
columns under the title “OLS regression estimates” give the β1 coefficients from equation 1 
without inclusion of dummy variables for work unit.  The columns under the title “Fixed 
Effects Models” give the β1 coefficients for the models with inclusion of the dummy 
variables for work unit. The key finding in the table is that workers who join the share plan 
perform better than those who do not join the share plan in all but one area of work behaviour 
regardless of the model specification.  The exception is in their response to observing a 
worker who is not doing a very good job.  Here members and non-members do not differ in 
their behaviour. 
 
The first dependent variable in the table relates to work effort relative to others.  It is derived 
from answers to two survey questions about work effort.  The first question is: “How hard 
would you say you work?” with responses on a 1 to 10 scale where 10 is “very hard" and 1 is 
the opposite.  The second question is about the effort of other workers: “At your workplace, 
how hard would you say that people work?” with responses coded on the same scale as 
above.  Plan members reported an average effort of 8.95.  Non-members of the Plan reported 
an average effort of 8.77 –  a difference that is statistically significant at a 99% confidence 
level. By contrast, both members and non-members rated the effort of other workers 
similarly.  Members give a mean score of the effort level of others of 7.71 and non-members 
give a mean score of 7.72. Differences in working harder relative to others between members 
and non-members thus reflect differences in the own work effort question.   
 
The regressions summarized in the table show a significant member/non-member difference 
in working hard relative to others, and in the analogous models that included dummy 
variables for work unit fixed effects.  
 
The second dependent variable in table 1 relates to hours worked relative to contractual hours 
worked.  Sixty-seven percent of plan members compared to 44 percent of non-members 
reported typically working more than their contractual hours each week.  Twenty-five percent 
of plan members said they typically worked at least 10 hours above contractual hours 
compared to only 11 percent of non-members. The regressions show the positive association 
between plan membership and working above contractual hours is robust to demographic and 
job controls and to the addition of workplace fixed effects.  Since most workers at ShareCo 
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are not paid overtime10, the long-hours of work for plan members cannot be attributed to an 
overtime premium. 
 
The third and fourth measures of workplace behaviour in the table come from the question 
"how many days have you been absent from work in the last six months (excluding 
vacation)”?  Plan members took less absence than non-members: 43 percent had taken some 
absence compared with 57 percent of non-members. Among workers who had been absent at 
least once, members averaged 3.7 days absent compared to an average of 4.4 days for non-
members. The dependent variable in regression 3 is a dichotomous variable for any absences.  
The dependent variable in regression 4 is days absent.  The second measure shows a 
statistically significant negative association between plan membership and absence behaviour 
across all model specifications.11  
 
The fifth and sixth measures of work-related behaviour relate to turnover. The dependent 
variable in the fifth regression comes from a question about whether the worker expected to 
leave the firm voluntarily within 12 months. Two percent of plan members compared to 9 
percent of non-members said they intended to leave.  This association holds up in all 
specifications.  The dependent variable in the sixth regression comes from the question: "how 
likely is it that you will actively look for a job with another organization in the next 12 
months?" The regressions show that plan members were significantly less likely than non-
members to anticipate actively seeking work elsewhere in the coming 12 months, a result that 
holds up with inclusion of work unit fixed effects. 
 
If the motivation for staying with the firm stems from maximizing financial returns from 
share plan participation, the link between membership and lower quit and job search 
probabilities would likely be strongest as workers approach five years in the share plan since 
that is when sale of shares are most tax-advantaged. We tested this proposition by replacing 
the membership dummy with a variable identifying the time employees had been in the share 
plan and found that the effect of plan membership on the likely quit behaviour and searching 
for another job do not differ significantly between members with under five years in the plan 
and members with at least five years in the plan.12  
 
The last two variables in Table 1 reflect worker responses to seeing another employee not 
working as they should.  We took the question from the NBER shared capitalism 
questionnaire (Blasi, Freeman, Kruse, 2010): "If you were to see a fellow employee not 
working as hard or as well as he or she should, how likely would you be to...discuss this with 
the employee; speak to your supervisor or manager; talk about it in a work group or team; do 
nothing", with possible responses from "not at all likely" through to "very likely".  We 
constructed two measures from these questions.  The first took the “do nothing” response and 
coded it as 0 for employees "very likely" to do nothing 1 for employees who gave other 
10  Eighty-six percent of employees receive no paid overtime in any given month (personal communication 
from the company). 
11  These results are robust to the use of negative binomial regression analysis of number of days absent 
treated as a continuous variable. 
12  Dropping non-members from these models confirms no significant difference in the quit and job search 




                                                 
responses.  The second sums responses to the first three questions with "not very likely" 
scoring 0, through to "very likely" scoring 3  to construct an additive scale.   
 
Because workers are more likely to take action the easier it is for them to observe how hard 
co-workers are working and are less to likely to intervene when they are closely supervised 
(Freeman. Kruse, Blasi, 2010) we include these variables as additional independent variables 
in this equation. 
 
Regressions seven and eight in the table show little association between plan membership and 
greater co-worker monitoring. These results differ from those in Freeman, Kruse, and Blasi 
(2010), which found that workers paid through group incentive systems were far more likely 
to monitor fellow workers and intervene when they find other workers performing poorly. 
The likely reason for this is the division within an ESPP between workers who have joined 
the plan and those who have not.  In a company where all workers are covered by the same 
group incentive system, workers can press fellow employees to do their best in the interest of 
all.  By contrast, in a company where only some workers have aligned their income with firm 
performance, the division of workers into members and non-members may make it more 
difficult for some to press others.  This suggests that members would engage in more co-
monitoring when they are in a workplace with relatively more members.  We tested this 
explanation by estimating the co-monitoring equation separately for members and non-
members (Table 3).  The coefficient on perceptions of membership rates among co-workers 
(PCMEMB) was significantly positive for members but not for non-members, consistent with 
the view that employees engage in more co-worker monitoring when they think more 
workers are in the plan and should therefore reciprocate on the gift than when they think that 
more co-workers have rejected the gift/incentive exchange.  
 
ShareCo's share price mattered to its employees. One-quarter of employees checked the share 
price daily, but this was true for 38% of members compared with 13% of non-members. We 
begin with employee reports on their assessment of how the share plan impacts their quit 
behaviour and work motivation.  We asked workers if the ShareCo share plan "reduces the 
chance that you will leave the firm".  Sixty-six percent of plan members answered “to some 
extent” or “to a great extent” while by contrast, just 24 percent of non-members so reported.  
One interpretation of the 24% number is that even non-member workers view the plan as an 
indicator that ShareCo is a good employer, and are more likely to stay.  Another 
interpretation is that the 24% reflects some baseline fraction of workers who intend to stay 
with the firm and latch onto the reason for staying that the question poses.  The key statistic is 
the 42 percentage point difference between plan members and non-members who cite the 
plan as a factor that reduces the chance of exiting the firm.  To probe this interpretation we 
regressed the dichotomous variable of whether or not workers cited the plan as reducing their 
chances of leaving by a lot or to a great extent on plan membership in multivariate regression 
model 1.  The regression estimate of the effect of plan membership on citing the plan as 
reducing the chance of leaving in the future was 0.32, smaller than the difference in means 
but still large and statistically significant.  
 
We also asked workers if the ShareCo share plan "increases your motivation".  Sixty percent 
of members said "to some extent" or "to a great extent", compared to 21 percent of non-
members, which gives a 39 percentage point difference.  This difference also remains large 
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and significant in regression analyses based on equation 1.  Workers at least believe that their 
joining the plan affects their work behaviour.  
 
Our second mode of assessing the possible causal impact of share plan participation on 
employee behaviour is to instrument plan membership in 2010 on a variable that arguably 
affects membership but does not affect 2010 behaviour.  Using ShareCo administrative data 
we obtained the number of employees eligible for and participating in the share plan by office 
and business unit for each year from 2007-2010.  We instrumented employees' share plan 
membership in 2010 on membership in their office/business unit in 2009.  The assumption is 
that membership in their office a year ago will be associated with membership in 201013 but 
not with workplace behaviours. Table 2 compares OLS estimates of plan membership on 
worker effort with estimates of plan membership instrumented by the lagged membership 
measure.  Row 1 columns 1 and 2 show that the membership coefficient on working harder 
falls when we instrument for membership but the coefficient is less precisely estimated than 
in the OLS case.  But row 2 columns 1 and 2 indicate that instrumenting membership 
increases the coefficient on membership for working long hours and increases the precision 
with which the coefficient is estimated.  In the case of work absence and voluntary quits, the 
negative coefficients on membership rise when instrumented but they are also less precisely 
estimated and become statistically non-significant. In row 6 the member coefficient becomes 
more negative when instrumented and retains its statistical significance at a 99 per cent 
confidence level.  In rows 7 and 8 plan membership is not significantly associated with 
worker co-monitoring in the OLS or IV estimates. These results suggest that treating plan 
membership as exogenous may understate the causal impact of plan membership, but a more 
plausible interpretation of the increased coefficient is that the parameter recovered with the 
IV estimates is the local average treatment effect (LATE) and is thus not directly comparable 
with the average treatment-on-the-treated effect recovered through the OLS (Blundell et al., 
2005).  Plan effects may be larger for  high ability workers than for low ability workers 
because high ability workers are better able to repay the gift (Englmaier and Leider, 2008). 
 
In Table 3 we explore the possibility that perceived membership rates among peers may have 
a spillover effect on one's own behaviour.  This appears to be the case. As noted above, 
members' monitoring efforts rise with the proportion of their peers who they think are plan 
members, something that does not happen to non-members. Non-members seem less inclined 
to seek a job elsewhere where they are surrounded by what they perceive to be a higher 
percentage of Plan members. Although one might anticipate workers working if they feel 
more Plan members are "breathing down their neck" monitoring what they are up to. In fact, 
as row 1 indicates, both members and non-members perceive their relative hard work to be 
lower where they are surrounded by more members. A natural explanation for this finding is 
that both members and non-members equate membership with hard workers, such that 
perceptions of higher membership rates are associated with higher estimates of colleagues' 
work efforts. 
 
Finally, we seek to distinguish between Plan membership effects arising through financial 
incentives on the one hand, and those associated with gift exchange on the other. We draw on 
the model of Akerlof and Kranton (1995; 2008) under which workers are motivated to work 
13  This variable strongly predicts individual share plan membership in 2010 (the coefficient is significant 
at a 99.9% confidence level in the first stage membership equation).  
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harder when part of a cohesive team with a group identity.  Under their model, group identity 
enters the worker's utility function alongside income and effort: identification with the group 
lowers the cost of effort, thus raising productivity.14 This group identification can be actively 
promoted by employers through gift exchange (Dodlova and Yudkevich, 2009).  We 
examined whether joining ShareCo's ESPP was associated with an indicator of group 
cohesiveness, namely whether the individual "socialises with co-workers outside of work".  
We estimated equations for socialising using the pooled 2007-2010 UK data.  Controlling for 
demographic and job characteristics, Plan members were 7 percent more likely to socialise 
with colleagues outside of work than non-members (.07, t=2.94).l.  The effect is similar 
within office/business units (.07, t=2.66).  To check whether this result isn't simply picking 
up the possibility that members simply have a higher tendency to participate in a variety of 
activities, we ran the same estimates for the other six activities we asked them about in the 
survey (belonging to a trade or professional body/association; working with schools colleges 
or universities; involvement in charities or voluntary bodies; membership of a social, sports 
or arts club; membership of a political party; and membership of a religious group).  Joining 
the ESPP was not significantly associated with any of these other activities.15 
 
To test the link between ESPP joining, group identity and worker behaviour we ran separate 
models for those who socialised with colleagues outside of work and those who did not.  It is 
apparent that the links between ESPP membership and the intensive effort margin - working 
harder than colleagues and working longer than standard hours - are confined to those 
members who socialised with colleagues outside of work (Table 4, rows 1 and 2).  This 
finding is consistent with the ESPP encouraging effort through group identification 
engendered via gift exchange.  It would not be anticipated in a standard financial incentives 
framework. However, the association between ESPP membership and the extensive effort 
margin - as indicated by a lower propensity to quit and lower likelihood of job search - were 
apparent for members whether or not they socialised with colleagues.  One possible 
interpretation of these results is that ESPP effects emanate both from gift exchange and 
financial incentives.  Indeed, the combination of the two may be particularly powerful.  As 
Akerlof and Kranton (2005: 15) note: "monetary incentives and motivation by identity can be 




This study has found within the same firm, and even within the same work unit (a business 
unit grouping within a workplace) that employees who accept the gift of subsidized shares of 
stock via an ESPP have superior work performances along several dimensions – working 
hard, putting in extra hours, showing less likely turnover, having lower absences – than 
employees who reject the gift.  These results resemble the findings in studies of gift 
exchanges/efficiency wages that find that workers respond to gifts or higher wages given up 
front by reciprocating with better performance in the future and to studies of group incentive 
systems that find that workers respond to group incentives with better performance as well.  
What is distinct about our analysis is that the findings are based on the responses of workers 
14  Others have pointed to the importance of group identity for worker productivity. Falk and Ichino 
(2003) show levels of effort depend on interactions with co-workers. Fehr and Gachter (1999: 362) note "group 
identity is like a lubricant that makes social exchange effective". 
15  Full results are available from the authors on request. 
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who accept/reject the treatment rather than on comparisons of workers across workplaces that 
give all workers the same treatment.   
 
Employee stock purchase plans, gift exchanges, and group incentive systems have one 
overriding similarity.  None of these schemes could succeed if all workers followed the logic 
of free-riding behaviour.  Free riders would accept higher wages in a gift exchange model and 
do nothing to improve the performance of the firm.  Free riders would purchase subsidized 
shares and do nothing to improve performance and raise the share price.  In both cases the 
firm would be out of pocket for its initial gift and would either stop granting the gifts in the 
future or lose market share to firms that paid fixed wages. The economics of a group 
incentive system is a bit different.  Free riders would not respond to the group incentive so it 
would have no effect on output but, assuming the incentives were set correctly, this would 
cost the firm nothing.  The firm could leave the system in place or not.  It would not matter.   
 
That these systems are found in labor markets throughout the world and are associated with 
better performance implies that all three overcome the free rider incentive in some fashion.  
The differences among them are subtle.   
 
In a gift exchange/efficiency wage model, the firm bears the initial risk that employees will 
not reciprocate.  The workers who reciprocate bear a risk that they may do too much in 
response to the gift and not get their full share of their extra effort.  But ideally the  system 
will equilibrate the level of gifts to produce benefits for both workers and the firm which 
balances the marginal costs and benefits to the worker and firm. In a group incentive system, 
the firm bears no initial risk.  Workers who respond to the incentives get a share of the 
benefits.  If the firm has set the incentives appropriately the system will produce benefits for 
workers and firms with each balancing their marginal benefits and costs.   
 
Abstracting from the mechanisms by which firms/workers overcome free-riding and risk 
issues, an ideal gift exchange system and an ideal group incentive system will produce the 
same outcomes, with a size of the gift/parameter for group incentive pay that leaves no “extra 
output” on the table.  
 
An employee share purchase system has attributes of both systems. It offers the gift of 
subsidized shares but it also offers group incentive pay since the value of shares will be 
higher the higher workers' effort.  It also differs from gift and group incentives by requiring 
workers to put up some of their own money to take advantage of the gift. If all workers join 
the plan, the ideal ESPP would produce the same outcome as the ideal gift exchange and 
group incentive systems.  Tax incentives aside, the firm would subsidize shares in such a way 
as to leave no extra output on the table.  
 
The part of an ESPP that offers unique insight into behaviour is its allowing workers to 
accept or reject the gift of matched shares. Again abstracting from the mechanisms that 
overcome free riding, workers who accept the plan presumably have lower disutility of work 
than those who reject the plan. By allowing workers to choose to reciprocate or not, the ESPP 
is presumptively socially more efficient than gift exchange or incentive systems that treat all 
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Table 1: Estimated Differences in Behaviour of Workers Who Join the ShareCo ESPP 
and Observationally Equivalent Workers Who Do Not Join the Plan - OLS and Work 
Unit Fixed Effects Models 
 
 OLS Fixed Effects with Work Unit 
Dummy variables 
1)  How hard workers work relative to  how hard other employees work 
Member 0.21 (1.97)** 0.31 (2.57)*** 
Adj R-sq 0.05 0.05 
   
2)  Hours worked relative to standard hours 
Member 0.10 (2.65)*** 0.11 (2.59)*** 
Adj R-sq 0.44 0.44 
   
3) Any absence   
Member -0.06 (1.66)  -0.06 (1.53) 
Adj R-sq 0.08 0.10 
   
4)  Days absent   
Member -0.37 (2.93)*** -0.36 (2.63)*** 
Adj R-sq 0.09 0.10 
   
5) Voluntary quits 
Member -0.04 (2.77)***  -0.03 (2.21)** 
Adj R-sq 0.10 0.10 
   
6) Job search   
Member -0.25 (4.15)*** -0.23 (3.60)*** 
Adj R-sq 0.38 0.40 
   
7) Do-Nothing in response to seeing another worker not doing good job  (categorical) 
Member 0.02 (0.75) 0.01 (0.38) 
Adj R-sq 0.05 0.06 
   
8) Additive Measure of Intervening with another worker who is not doing good job 
Member -0.09 (0.68)  -0.04 (0.29) 
Adj R-sq 0.17 0.17 
 
Notes: 
(1) N=1,063 in all models. Fixed effects models absorb 39 office/business unit categories. 
Coefficients are from OLS; t-statistics in parentheses. **=statistically significant at a 95% 
confidence level; ***=statistically significant at a 99% confidence level 
 
(2) How hard workers work 
The working harder scale runs from (-10,10). It is the difference between workers assessment 
of how hard they work relative to their perception of how hard co-workers work, as described  
in the text. Model 1 is the estimate of equation 1 with the following controls: age and age 
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squared; male; white; degree; married or living as married; risk scale;  occupation (7 
dummies); supervisory status; hours worked (4 dummies); tenure; log annual wages; scale for 
organizational loyalty (see text for details).  
 
3) Hours worked relative to standard hours 
Respondents are asked "How many hours do you work for ShareCo each week?" and to 
distinguish "standard hours, excluding additional time worked" and "typical hours, including 
overtime, working at home and weekend work".  We subtract standard hours from typical 
hours to identify hours worked above contract.  The model estimates a (1,3) ordered variable 
where 1=no additional hours 2=>0 but <10 hours 3=10+ hours per week. See note 1 for 
model specifications, sample sizes and notation. 
 
4) and 5) Any absence and days absent 
Respondents are asked "how many days have you been absent from work in the last six 
months (excluding vacation)?" The dependent variable in 3) is any absence. In 4) we use a 
categorical absence variable which splits the continuous days measure into six categories: 
none, >0<=1,  >1<=2, >2<=3, >3<=4, >4<=5, >5. See note 1 for model specifications, 
sample sizes and notation. 
 
6) Voluntary quits 
Estimates models for a quit dummy where 1=expects to work at ShareCo for less than a year 
and says not very/not at all likely to be laid off. See note 1 for model specifications, sample 
sizes and notation. 
 
7) Job search 
Estimates the likelihood of looking for a job with another organization in next 12 months 
using an ordinal scale where 1="not at all likely" to 5="very likely". See note 1 for model 
specifications, sample sizes and notation. 
 
8) and 9) Co-worker monitoring 
The two dependent variables are derived from the following question: " If you were to see a 
fellow employee not working as hard or as well as he or she should, how likely would you be 
to...discuss this with the employee; speak to your supervisor or manager; talk about it in a 
work group or team; do nothing?".  Responses to the four questions were coded from "not at 
all likely" through to "very likely". The "do nothing" scale used in 7) run from 1 to 4 simply 
coding the fourth "do nothing" question so that those who say they are "not at all likely" to do 
nothing score 1 and those who say they are "very likely" to do nothing score 4. The co-
monitoring scale used in 8) is an additive scale which sums responses to the first three 
questions with "not very likely" scoring 1, through to "very likely" scoring 3.  We subtract 3 
from the scale so that it runs from zero to nine. See note 1 for model specifications but note 
these models also include controls for how easy it is to see how hard your co-workers are 
working and how closely supervised you are in your job, both of which are coded on a (1,10) 
scale. See note 1 for sample size and notation. 
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Table 2: Estimated Differences in Behaviour of Workers Who Join the ShareCo ESPP 
and Observationally Equivalent Workers Who Do Not Join the Plan - OLS and IV 
Models 
 
 OLS IV 
1)  How hard workers work relative to  how hard other employees work 
Member 0.30 (2.55)*** 0.20 (0.41) 
Adj R-sq 0.07 0.07 
   
2)  Hours worked relative to standard hours 
Member 0.09 (2.07)** 0.48 (2.51)*** 
Adj R-sq 0.43 0.38 
   
3) Any absence   
Member -0.05 (1.33) -0.18 (1.21) 
Adj R-sq 0.09 0.08 
   
4)  Days absent   
Member -0.36 (2.54)*** -0.68 (1.12) 
Adj R-sq 0.10 0.09 
   
5) Voluntary quits 
Member -0.04 (2.55)*** -0.11 (1.58) 
Adj R-sq 0.13 0.11 
   
6) Job search   
Member -0.31 (4.79)** -0.96 (3.43)**** 
Adj R-sq 0.37 0.30 
   
7) Do-Nothing in response to seeing another worker not doing good job  (categorical) 
Member 0.01 (0.53) 0.08 (0.80) 
Adj R-sq 0.06 0.06 
   
8) Additive Measure of Intervening with another worker who is not doing good job 
Member -0.05 (0.34) 0.57 (0.98) 
Adj R-sq 0.17 0.18 
 
Notes: 
(1) OLS and IV models where instrument is lagged plan membership rate in the worker's 
office*business work unit. N=855. Reduction in sample size because reliance on lagged 
membership rate in work unit excludes newly formed units. 
(2) Instrument performs well in first stage membership model with a t-statistic of 7.75. Partial 
R-squared of excluded instruments:   0.0609. Test of excluded instruments:  F(  1,   833) =    
60.11   Prob > F      =   0.0000 
(3) See Table 1 for notation and model details. 
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Table 3: Estimated Spillover Effect of Perceived Plan Membership in One's Work Unit 
Among Plan Members and Non-members 
 
 Members Non-members 
1)  How hard workers work relative to  how hard other employees work 
PCMEMB -0.19 (3.38)*** -0.24 (2.96)*** 
Adj R-sq 0.12 0.05 
   
2)  Hours worked relative to standard hours 
PCMEMB -0.01 (0.60) -0.02 (0.78) 
Adj R-sq 0.50 0.32 
   
3) Any absence   
PCMEMB 0.03 (1.39) -0.02 (0.67) 
Adj R-sq 0.04 0.14 
   
4)  Days absent   
PCMEMB 0.10 (1.46) 0.01 (0.15) 
Adj R-sq 0.03 0.10 
   
5) Voluntary quits 
PCMEMB -0.00 (0.75) -0.01 (1.34) 
Adj R-sq 0.03 0.10 
   
6) Job search   
PCMEMB -0.01 (0.39) -0.15 (3.34)*** 
Adj R-sq 0.36 0.36 
   
7) Do-Nothing in response to seeing another worker not doing good job  (categorical) 
PCMEMB -0.02 (1.73)* 0.01 (0.35) 
Adj R-sq 0.09 0.06 
    
8) Additive Measure of Intervening with another worker who is not doing good job 
PCMEMB 0.17 (2.19)** 0.03 (0.40) 
Adj R-sq 0.21 0.22 
Notes: 
(1) Work unit fixed effects models for members and non-members separately. Model 
specification identical to Table 1 FE column except we replace individual Plan membership 
with employee's perception of the percentage of employees in the business unit who are 
members of the Plan. The categorical responses are entered as a linear term. 
(2) N=591 for members and 472 for non-members 
(3) See Table 1 for notation and model details. 
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Table 4: Plan Membership and Effort and the Role of Group Identity 
 
 Socialises Does not socialise 
 OLS Fixed Effects OLS Fixed Effects 
How hard 
relative to others 
.30 (2.56)**  .31 (2.32)**  .13 (1.03)  .23 (1.65)  
Hours relative to 
standard 
.07 (1.69)  .11 (2.31)**  .05 (1.15)  .03 (0.63)  
Any absence -.04 (1.08)  -.02 (0.47)  -.01 (0.29)  -.01 (0.02)  
N days absent -.28 (2.08)**  -.19 (1.33)  -.11 (0.78)  -.13 (0.86)  
Voluntary quits -.05 (2.81)**  -.05 (2.40)**  -.06 (3.33)**  -.07 (3.39)**  
Job search -.40 (5.28)**  -.37 (4.45)**  -.37 (4.70)**  -.33 (3.95)**  
Does nothing in 
response to 
others 




.09 (0.69)  .13 (0.90)  .02 (0.10)  .08 (0.51)  
Notes: 
(1) Separate OLS and work unit fixed effects models for those who socialise with colleagues 
and those who do not. Respondents are asked whether they "socialise with co-workers 
outside of work". Coefficients and t-statistics relate to the Plan membership dummy in these 
equations. 
(2) N=970 for those who socialise and N=850 for those who do not.   
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